In our timeline, after the battles along the Scheldt, a lull at the front allowed Germany to assemble thirty well-prepared divisions. In evaluating how to best utilize this force, Hitler devised an ill-fated plan: he intended to launch these troops against the Western Front in a bid for a quick victory. The aim of Operation Watch on the Rhine was to gain momentum for negotiating a peace agreement with the Western Allies, after which Germany could fully concentrate on its efforts against the USSR.
Whereas in this alternate history scenario, we imagine that Hitler dies of a fatal stroke in late 1944, and his successors abandon Operation Watch on the Rhine to launch a different counter-offensive in the East, Operation Watch on the Vistula.
Jan 20, 1945 -
The Red Army launched a large offensive along the Vistula River in central Poland after favorable weather conditions were forecasted. This strategic thrust for the River Oder in Germany, located just 40 miles from Berlin, was made possible by the stunning success of Operation Bagration that created a significant Soviet bridgehead over the Vistula in the area of Baranów with the front continuing south to Jasło.
The main Axis defense was German Army Group A, which had recently been reinforced with thirty well-prepared divisions from the West. Previously, there were three outnumbered armies within this group: the 9th Army, deployed around Warsaw; the 4th Panzer Army, situated opposite the Baranów salient in the Vistula Bend; and the 17th Army to their south. In command was Colonel-General Josef Harpe, recipient of the Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross with Oak Leaves and Swords. A brave man, his instructions were terrifyingly clear: destroy the Baranów salient and protect the Reich's capital. It was the tallest order since 1914 when Hindenburg and Ludendorff had been sent to East Prussia to confront the Russian steamroller.
The political objective of Operation Watch on the Vistula was far more complex and arguably even less realistic. After the Führer's death in late 1944, the leadership group, comprising his former inner circle, was led by Göring, Himmler and Bormann. These successors were constantly vying for control, but they shared the common belief that German interests lay in surrendering to the Western Allies. Their new strategy required a defensive posture on the Eastern front. As envisaged by this plan, Germany and ideally free buffer states in Hungary, Bohemia, and Western Poland would have to fall to occupation by the Western Allies while German Army Group A held back Soviet forces in Poland. This would allow time to explore various end-game contingencies: pursue negotiations via the neutral Swedes, trade safe passage in exchange for the exclusive transfer of advanced rocket technology, fight alongside the Western Allies against the Soviets or worse case a flight to South America with or without the assistance of Director of the OSS in Switzerland, Allen Dulles.
Stalin clearly understood these strategic goals, as his thrust for the River Oder aimed to acquire advanced rocket technology, control all of Poland, and seize as much German territory as possible to create a satellite buffer zone in Eastern Europe. Unfortunately for him, the additional firepower from the thirty-division reinforcements enabled Harpe to inflict a significant setback on the Red Army, resulting in considerable losses in manpower and resources. By the end of February, as the thaw set in and tanks became bogged down in Poland, the situation returned to where it had started. On the Western front, there was also good news, as the Germans executed a courageous fighting retreat - a faster 'pullout' withdrawal being logistically impossible. The Wehrmacht put up just enough resistance to slow the Allied advance without significantly depleting the manpower or supplies needed on the Eastern Front.
Meanwhile, German refugees were evacuated in a reversal of the lebensraum concept that had driven Barbarossa. The heads of government for the Big Three (Stalin, FDR & Churchill) met in Yalta to try to synchronise their plans for moving forward in this radically changed landscape. Delegates from neutral Sweden would attend, carrying peace proposals from Berlin. Because the Empire of Japan had launched their own bid for conditional surrender, Operation Ichi-Go, there was the prospect of creating a roadmap for peace with the Axis. In outline, this would grant some form of limited clemency to the defeated leadership in exchange for the immediate end of hostilities.
The Big Three were certainly willing to walkback the unconditional surrender condition they had stipulated at the Casablance Conference, particularly since Stalin had not even been in attendance. He was less willing to reduce his ambitions for a Soviet sphere of influence up to the Baltic States (Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia), Belarus, Ukraine and Eastern Poland. The dying FDR surely believed he could work with the Soviets within his vision for the United Nations, but Churchill strongly disagreed. His intention was to "impose the will of the United States and the UK upon the Soviets" and indeed had asked his general staff to prepare war plans for "Operation Unthinkable." If the Western Allies could capture and occupy Germany, Bohemia, Hungary, and Western Poland, this would put them in a strong position; if Germany surrendered at the Vistula in central Poland, then this would essentially be a fait accompli.
An unexpected variable was the sudden demise of FDR, a tragic event that brought to power Harry Truman. He was far less trusting of Stalin, emboldened with the knowledge that the atomic bomb project was fast approaching conclusion. At Potsdam, he threatened Stalin with the stark warning that the United States had a "new weapon of unusual destructive force" without specifying that it was an atomic bomb. In a sense, the German capitulation only 'opened the wound,' bringing forward the disputes about the shape of post-war Europe, requiring the United Nations to make an unequal agreement before settling with the Axis...
Author's Note:
In reality, the Western Allies stopped around the Elbe River, allowing the USSR to take Berlin and much of Eastern Europe. The Vistula-Oder offensive obliterated Army Group A, advancing over 300 miles in just over two weeks - a remarkable pace. The offensive was brought forward from 20 to 12 January because meteorological reports warned of a thaw later in the month, and the tanks needed hard ground for the offensive. It was not done to assist American and British forces during the Battle of the Bulge, as Stalin chose to claim at Yalta. Meanwhile, the attack in the West did not succeed, despite being a significant blow to the Allies and the bloodiest battle of World War II for the United States. The assault was halted more quickly than anticipated and ultimately repelled. The Germans failed to achieve any meaningful breakthrough. Even if the attack had been successful, there was no possibility that the US and UK would sign a separate peace. By that time, they were committed to ending the war only with the unconditional surrender of Germany, as agreed upon at the Casablanca Conference in 1943. Therefore, the entire purpose of the attack was rendered irrelevant.
Provine's Addendum:
Following the conclusion of hostilities with Germany, the Allies turned their attention to the Far East. That fall, Japan surrendered following the Americans' atomic bomb as well as USSR declaration of war and invasion of Manchuria. American General George C. Marshall arrived as a special envoy to China; initially, he had hoped to broker peace between the Kuomitang and Communists, but anti-Soviet sentiment and Chiang Kai-Shek's vow to eliminate communism in China prompted a faster course of action with establishing formal borders along the occupation zones, creating North China and South China much like East and West Poland. An "Iron Curtain" fell across Europe and Asia, but the Western powers were far more concerned with recovery and de-colonizing in a way that continued to benefit the home countries. There seemed to be no need of a race into space with American rocket superiority decades more advanced nor wars to halt any theory of nations falling like dominoes since no one seemed able to tip beyond the curtain. The "Cold War" was just that--borders frozen until the fall of communism some fifty years later.