This post first appeared on Today in Alternate History
Supreme Commander Allied Forces South West Pacific Area General Douglas
MacArthur issued General Headquarters Operational Instruction No.7
placing all Australian and US Army, Air Force, and Navy Forces in the
Port Moresby Area under the control of New Guinea Force.
Six
months earlier, MacArthur had
been recalled to active duty in the United States Army and designated
commander of the United States Armed Forces in the Asia-Pacific region.
In this role, he had led the defending Philippine and United States
troops against a Japanese invasion ten hours after the attack on Pearl
Harbor. The aircraft under his command were destroyed; the naval
forces were ordered to leave; and, because of the circumstances in the
Pacific region, reinforcement and resupply of his ground forces were
impossible. MacArthur was ordered to Australia, where he started to plan
for a return to the Philippines
Given his recent failure to properly prepare or execute the
defense of the Philippines, this reorganization of the New Guinea Force
might have been viewed with a healthy degree of skepticism. The truth
was that, prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor, Washington had been
reluctant to invest in defensive reinforcements at a time when the
Commonwealth was preparing for full independence. The reality now
was rather different; unlike his unhappy experience in the Philippines,
MacArthur actually had massive support from Washington, making a decision that
was high-profile but also ill-fated. A key strategic
decision was to massively reinforce the Australian Armed
Forces. Given the staggering amount of military resources that the
Empire of Japan would pour into New Guinea, this move not only made a
great deal of tactical sense but also made the south-west area the center point of the American effort in the Pacific War.
The military logic was fundamentally sound but overshadowed by the wider Germany First vs. Japan First
debate, which had raged for months. Almost inevitably, the final
outcome would be that both theatres would be given equal priority.
MacArthur privately called this fudge the "Both First, Japan Quickest" strategy, which in cynical terms was exactly what it was. There were two
main corollaries of this equal priority strategy adopted by America: to
use submarine warfare as a primary means to interdict Japanese shipping
and to send greater troop strengths to Borneo and New Guinea. This
later decision was a tacit acknowledgement that the fighting in China
and Burma would not shorten the war.
Aircraft carrier production was up to full speed by late 1943. Thanks to the
submariners, Japan was unable to support the Imperial armies fighting on
mainland Asia, let alone return them to the Home Islands for defensive
purposes.
MacArthur began to prepare his forces for a knock-out blow from a nearby
island, requesting massive reinforcements. Unfortunately, the US was
unable to simultaneously invade Japan and France; therefore, the "Equal Priority" strategy had backfired. The fudge came back to haunt
President Roosevelt and Chief of Staff George C. Marshall, who bitterly
quarreled with MacArthur. This dispute would result in MacArthur's relief
leading to him entering the presidential race for 1944.
Author's Note:
In
reality, during the second phase, lasting from late 1942 until the
Japanese surrender, the Allies--consisting primarily of Australian
forces--cleared the Japanese first from Papua, then the Mandate, and
finally from the Dutch colony.